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THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DEMOCRACY: 
THE EPISTEMIC VIRTUES OF DEMOCRACY
ABSTRACT
The new and vibrant field of the epistemology of democracy, or the 
inquiry about the epistemic justification of democracy as a social system 
of procedures, institutions, and practices, as a cross-disciplinary endeavour, 
necessarily encounters both epistemologists and political philosophers. 
Despite possible complaints that this kind of discussion is either insufficiently 
epistemological or insufficiently political, my approach explicitly aims to 
harmonize the political and epistemic justification of democracy. In this 
article, I tackle some fundamental issues concerning the nature of the 
epistemic justification of democracy and the best theoretical framework 
for harmonizing political and epistemic values. I also inquire whether the 
proposed division of epistemic labour and the inclusion of experts can 
indeed improve the epistemic quality of decision-making without 
jeopardizing political justification. More specifically, I argue in favour of 
three theses. First, not only democratic procedures but also the outcomes 
of democracy, as a social system, need to be epistemically virtuous. 
Second, democracy’s epistemic virtues are more than just a tool for 
achieving political goals. Third, an appropriate division of epistemic labour 
has to overcome the limitations of both individual and collective intelligence.
1. The Epistemic Justification of Democracy
To immediately dispel any uncertainty about the philosophical discipline or 
research field where my book, Democracy and Truth: The Conflict Between 
Political and Epistemic Virtues, belongs, I must say it is epistemology: my re-
search focuses on the question of the epistemic value of different doxastic atti-
tudes, such as beliefs, decisions, or opinions. However, since we aren’t dealing 
with the epistemic properties of the beliefs held by individuals, which tradi-
tional (individual) epistemology used to do, but with the features of democ-
racy as a system, it is clear this topic transcends the boundaries of tradition-
al epistemology. The research field in question is social epistemology, which 
has legitimized inquiry into the epistemic features not only of individuals, but 
of groups, institutions, and systems (Goldman 1999; 2010). Up until recently, 
this topic was shunned as foreign to “real” epistemology, and as a question 
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that we, eventually, ought to assign to some social sciences. Due to this atti-
tude, many have concluded that “real” epistemology does not need to exist, 
have proclaimed the death of epistemology, and embarked on the journey of 
post-modern philosophy and sociology of knowledge, which focus primarily 
on the social conditions of forming beliefs and knowledge (Rorty 1979, Hollis 
and Lukes 1982, Foucault 1991). In contrast to these trends, I hold that episte-
mology is very much alive and that the epistemic analysis of democracy is a 
legitimate and relevant epistemological question. At the very least, if we have 
epistemology of testimony and the epistemology of disagreement, domains 
that have already extended the traditional epistemological approach, then we 
can legitimately speak also about the epistemology of democracy.
Since the justification of democracy is a topic that was tackled primarily by 
political philosophy, the epistemology of democracy and any inquiry about the 
epistemic justification of democracy necessarily encounter concepts and theo-
ries that don’t belong to the epistemological vocabulary, but to that of political 
philosophy. Such encounters can result in confusion and misunderstandings that 
arise from specific disciplinary presumptions, aims, and terminologies. These 
disputes are precisely the reason why such interdisciplinary endeavors can alarm 
both epistemologists and political philosophers. Political philosophers were the 
first who, within their discussions in political philosophy, assumed attitudes 
related to the epistemic features of democracy, such as epistemic procedural-
ism (Estlund 2008a; 2008b, Peter 2008, 2013). Within the field of epistemol-
ogy, philosophers assumed their position much later, locating their discussion 
in the space of the epistemic theory of democracy. This new category empha-
sized they weren’t offering a political theory and avoided delving deeper into 
the political justification of democracy (Goodin and Spiekermann 2018). Cogni-
zant that the field of epistemology of democracy is cross-disciplinary and (still) 
somewhat ambiguous, I nonetheless hold that, from the perspective of episte-
mology, it is both valuable and vital to attempt to offer not only an epistemic 
justification of democracy as a political system but to explain the relationship 
between the epistemic and the political justification of democracy. Political 
justification alone, a rationale that neglects the epistemic, but also epistemic 
justification alone, cannot provide a comprehensive answer to the question of 
whether democracy can be justified as a system of solving problems through 
collective decision-making and collective belief, i.e., to the question what forms 
of collective decision-making/collective beliefs best solve the citizens’ issues. 
In real life, and concerning real issues, democracy is either good, or it is not; it 
is either justified, or it is not – if we are seeking real benefits, it is worthless to 
say it is politically justified but not epistemically, and vice versa. 
A democratic system can be politically justified without generating epistem-
ically valuable decisions. Another arrangement could be epistemically efficient 
while entailing unacceptable political consequences for the democratic ratio-
nale. In the first case, we can imagine a fair system where all citizens are treat-
ed as free and equal but lack epistemic maturity and valuable beliefs, so these 
perfectly politically justified democratic procedures would result in low-quality 
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DEMOCRACY58 │ Snježana Prijić Samaržija
decisions that would harm everyone. Such a democratic system of collective 
decision-making cannot be justified. The experience of populist forms of col-
lective reasoning gives us the right to question the exclusivity of political justi-
fication precisely because, due to the poor quality of its decisions, it generates 
humbling effects on human rights, freedoms, the level of democratic values, 
and public equity. On the other hand, within the democratic context, it is pos-
sible to assign the right to decide to academic groups of experts who are epis-
temically efficient and rarely make mistakes but do not care about solving citi-
zens’ problems, and do not deal with applied research, but, instead, with their 
research priorities, which do not affect citizens. Or, even worse, experts who 
use their epistemic reputation for personal gain, harming civic interests. Either 
way, to be justified, democracy must be both politically and epistemically justi-
fied. Despite possible complaints that the discussion is not epistemic enough, 
or that it is not political enough, I have embarked on this project with the ex-
plicit aim of harmonizing the political and epistemic justification of democracy. 
By endorsing the stance that democracy is a system, to be legitimate, must 
be both politically and epistemically justified, I advocate for a hybrid view 
and, consequently, for hybrid justification: democracy must be, to the broad-
est possible extent, both politically and epistemically justified. The hybrid per-
spective allows for harmonization by, under specific circumstances, letting us 
optimally calibrate political and epistemic gains (Fricker 2007). Despite the 
fact this endeavor – due to its cross-disciplinarity and hybrid perspective – 
might be challenging, we have attained the final goal of philosophical analysis 
if we have created the preconditions of a (thorough) review and evaluation of 
real phenomena, and for their improvement. That is precisely the reason why 
I characterize this project as applied, and my philosophy is a real-world epis-
temology. Moreover, we can embrace Wolff’s vocabulary, and speak not only 
about real-world philosophy but about engaged philosophy: a philosophy that 
transcends existing theoretical and disciplinary boundaries, and that, aiming 
for social improvement, deals with real relationships, systems, and phenom-
ena (Wolff 2019).
Finally, within the research that I have dubbed the epistemology of democ-
racy, I endorse the stance of reliability democracy, as opposed primarily to 
epistemic proceduralism or consensualism (Estlund 2008, Peter 2008, Kitcher 
2011). In my opinion, despite its label of being “epistemic”, epistemic proce-
duralism lacks the tools to, among different procedures of fair collective deci-
sion-making, select that which is epistemically better, primarily because it re-
jects the existence of procedure-independent epistemic value. If we reduce the 
epistemic justification of democracy to the stance that fair procedures have the 
tendency to generate epistemic quality, we are left with the question of wheth-
er epistemic justification is reduced to the political, the procedural. Consensu-
alism, on the other hand, further sacrifices the epistemic value of decision to 
the goal of resolving disagreements and attaining consensus that, despite its 
political significance, entails no inherent epistemic value. By themselves, pro-
cedures and agreements do not generate epistemic quality unless some other 
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preconditions have been met. Only if we assume the beliefs we are harmoniz-
ing and introducing into fair procedures are already sufficiently epistemical-
ly valuable, their results can be epistemically justified. On the contrary, if the 
beliefs have no initial epistemic value, neither the fairest procedure nor the 
most unified consensus will provide a final decision of any epistemic quality. 
Epistemic justification is not just a supplementary and welcome side-effect to 
the fundamental political quality (a procedure or consensus), but it must be an 
integral part of our evaluation. With the goal of harmonization, we are seek-
ing the best balance of epistemic and political quality, which allows us to, in 
particular contexts, callibarate the final benefit or reduce the political for the 
epistemic, and vice versa.
I propose reliability democracy as an approach that contains the essential 
epistemic criteria that allow us to, among different kinds of democratic collec-
tive decision-making, procedures, and conciliations, detect those that will most 
reliably generate epistemic quality and, consequentially, best solve the citizens’ 
problems (Goldman 2010). We can attain the highest degree of reliability that a 
system will make epistemically valuable decisions/beliefs through the division 
of labor between citizens and experts (Kitcher 2011, Christiano 2012). Although 
experts are conventionally excluded from democratic procedures out of fear 
of epistocracy, or of undemocratic elite privilege, I hold that the exclusion of 
experts is a conscious sacrifice of epistemic quality, and, consequently, of the 
best democratic decisions. If epistemic justification is required for justifying 
democracy, then excluding experts is just as undemocratic as excluding citizens. 
***
The questions and comments raised by my esteemed colleagues refer precise-
ly to the aspects of my book I have briefly reviewed. They question the nature 
of the epistemic justification of democracy, the best theoretical framework for 
harmonizing political and epistemic values, and the question of whether the 
proposed harmonization of epistemic labor and the inclusion of experts, can 
indeed improve the epistemic quality of decision-making without threatening 
political justification. Each article has its integrity and complexity, and, with 
its relevance and value, transcends the aim of commenting on my book. My 
reply will focus on those aspects of their articles that contribute to furthering 
the debate, leaving further and broader discussions about some of the ques-
tions raised for another occasion.
2. Democracy, as a Social System, Needs to be Epistemically 
Virtuous 
Ivan Mladenović (2020) valuably refers to the difference between justifying 
democracy as a procedure of collective decision-making and justifying de-
mocracy as a system that solves citizens’ problems. Equally important is the 
assertion that the justification of democracy as a system presumes a broader 
definition of democracy as a set of institutions and practices, rather than just 
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF DEMOCRACY60 │ Snježana Prijić Samaržija
as a procedure of collective decision-making. He calls the other (broader) kind 
of justification – the justification of democracy as a system that solves prob-
lems – instrumentalist, to differentiate it from the first, which is procedural. 
Moreover, Mladenović stresses that the instrumentalist approach, as a conse-
quence, reasonably includes the question of the level of expertise and compe-
tence required for solving problems. In contrast, from the procedural perspec-
tive, such issues are not only secondary, but it is immediately apparent that 
any distinction between citizens (and particularly the practices of privileging 
experts or groups who get to decide for others) will be qualified as antagonis-
tic to democratic procedures. Mladenović classifies my approach to justifica-
tion, due to my focus on epistemically justifying deliberative democracy as a 
system, as deliberative epistemic instrumentalism. While he acknowledges the 
need for epistemic justification, he, unlike my approach, deems the position 
of epistemic proceduralism better suited for justifying democracy. The critical 
feature of epistemic proceduralism is the attitude that the focus of justifica-
tion is on democratic procedures, and that justified democratic procedures of 
public deliberation in collective decision-making will also generate epistemic 
quality. Epistemic quality, in this sense, is not something external and proce-
dure independent, but an inherent feature of democratic processes.
I have to agree that, within such a classification, Mladenović is entirely 
correct regarding several points: (i) my research indeed focuses on the epis-
temic features of democracy as a social system (institutions and practices), and 
questions the potential of a deliberation-based democratic system to generate 
epistemically valuable beliefs or decisions, (ii) the epistemic value of democ-
racy is not reducible to the political fairness of the collective decision-making 
procedure, which is central to the political justification of democracy, (iii) de-
mocracy will be epistemically justified in virtue of the epistemic value of its 
beliefs/decisions/solutions to problems, i.e., in virtue of its consequences and 
results, rather than its procedure. Resolving citizens’ issues is a manifestation of 
“truth,” a concept that I do not use in its strict epistemic meaning, but, instead, 
explicitly use as a “shortcut” or a mark of epistemic value. As a generic concept 
of epistemic quality, “truth” does not only refer to solving problems, but also 
to other epistemic accomplishments such as truth-conduciveness, truth-sen-
sitivity, empirical adequacy, accuracy, understanding, correctness, or like. It 
is these particular stances that determine my attitude within the epistemolo-
gy of democracy, and they stem from the assumptions of social epistemology, 
virtue epistemology, and the pluralism of epistemic value (according to which 
truth monism does not register other notable epistemic accomplishments).
Unlike Mladenović and other epistemic proceduralists (Estlund 2008, Peter 
2008; 2013), I do not think that ensuring that a procedure is fair will necessarily 
lead to epistemic quality. Such a stance strikes me as some kind of epistemic 
optimism, or even an epistemic idealism, a groundless hope that political vir-
tue will somehow generate the epistemic. Of course, regarding the procedur-
alist position, there is the question of what we consider the target of epistem-
ic quality – the procedure, or the final decision. In either version, I hold those 
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epistemic proceduralists, who negate the existence of procedure-independent 
epistemic value, also deny the autonomy of epistemic value and epistemic 
virtues, reducing them to the political value of the procedure. I consider Est-
lund’s epistemic proceduralism, which Mladenović mentions as an acceptable 
position, inconsistent because he negates procedure-independent epistemic 
value, but still speaks about some kind of tendency in procedures to generate 
correct decisions. How can we call a decision correct if there is no epistemic 
value to define what correctness is? More consistent is Fabienne Peter’s pure 
epistemic proceduralism, where all epistemic value is explicitly reduced to the 
fairness of the procedure. However, I consider both versions of epistemic pro-
ceduralism unacceptable because they neglect the intrinsic epistemic virtue 
of democracy. This consequence is precisely the reason why I characterized 
epistemic instrumentalism as a politically instrumentalist position, which in-
strumentalizes or sacrifices epistemic values to the political. I criticize both 
political and epistemic instrumentalism, which, on the other hand, instrumen-
talizes and sacrifices autonomous political virtue to the epistemic. Moreover, 
I hold that epistemic proceduralism is an elitist and undemocratic position. It 
is evident that I assign the term “instrumentalism”, a different meaning than 
Mladenović, which might give rise to possible confusion.
However, regardless of terminology, I acknowledge the importance of Mlad-
enović’s objection that insisting on epistemic value or the quality of outcomes 
already somehow privileges epistemic justification. Simply put, he objects that 
I might have fallen into the trap of sacrificing the political rationale for demo-
cratic procedures to the epistemic quality of their outcome. I hold that the val-
ue of political justification, understood as the act of justifying democracy as a 
collective decision-making procedure where all citizens are treated equally, is 
beyond dispute. Even so, I simultaneously hold that the question of the epis-
temic quality of the outcomes of democracy is legitimate if we are interested in 
the desirability of democracy as a system. The appropriateness of democracy, 
however, is not just a question of political philosophy, but the much broader 
question of civic interests – who care equally about the fairness of the system 
as about its capacity to generate correct decisions that resolve their problems. 
By inquiring about the justification or desirability of the outcomes of democ-
racy, I might transcend the disciplinary field of political philosophy and polit-
ical justification, but I do not bring it into question. I am certainly not trying 
to uproot political justification nor the democratic rationale. But neither will 
I sacrifice the epistemic rationale of outcomes.
3. The Epistemic Virtue of Democracy is more than an Appropriate 
Tool for Political Goals 
Elvio Baccarini (2020), like Mladenović, endorses the stance that epistemic jus-
tification is crucial to the justification of democracy, but also the stance that we 
ought to find the correct balance between political and epistemic justification. 
However, instead of the epistemic proceduralism that Mladenović located as 
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the optimal option for harmonizing political and epistemic justification, Bacca-
rini proposes Rawls’ conception of the legitimacy of democracy (Rawls 2005). 
Although he states that Rawls focuses primarily on political justification, Bac-
carini firmly endorses his sensitivity towards the epistemic rationale, which can 
be found in his stances regarding “reasonable persons”, “valid public reasons”, 
and “burdens of judgment”, which refer to the epistemic virtues of epistemic 
agents. In Baccarini’s view, it is virtue epistemology, which shifts the norma-
tive focus onto the epistemic agent, that allows us to understand the proper-
ties of reasonableness and the validity of public reasons as epistemic virtues: 
in doing this, virtue epistemology enables us to fully apply Rawls’ proposal to 
the epistemic justification of democracy. If we fulfill certain preconditions – 
such as public deliberation among reasonable persons who respect valid public 
reasons and the state of reasonable plurality – Baccarini holds that a demo-
cratic system will be epistemically justified, and its generated decisions of the 
highest epistemic quality. Setting the truthfulness of decisions/beliefs as the 
criterion of epistemic quality, according to him, is not only unnecessary but 
can threaten reasonable pluralism. Namely, there is generally no need to sub-
ject the epistemically desirable state of reasonable disagreement to a pointless 
quest for the ostensible truth. What is more, disputes about moral doctrines, 
theories of social justice, or ethical arguments (about abortion, medically as-
sisted suicide or moral enhancement) are inevitable, and every attempt to force 
the resolution of these disagreements is, according to Baccarini, a politically 
and epistemically unjustified attack on reasonable pluralism.
It is precisely social epistemology (Fricker 1998, Goldman 2010) and vir-
tue epistemology (Zagzebski 1996, Greco 2002, Sosa 2007, Roberts and Wood 
2007) that provide us with an appropriate theoretical framework for assessing 
the epistemic features of a system such as democracy. We can inquire whether 
a democratic system – and its institutions, practices, and procedures – have 
epistemic virtues in addition to the political, whether they solve the citizens’ 
problems, whether they generate beliefs/decisions that are truth-conductive, 
truth-sensitive, correct, accurate, empirically adequate, or like. Baccarini en-
dorses a certain simplification and relaxation of epistemic demands and ties 
them exclusively to the virtue of reasonableness. Given the pluralism of epis-
temic values that I support as an alternative to truth monism, the proposal that 
reasonableness is a kind of generic epistemic virtue can be acceptable. There 
are epistemic accomplishments – such as reasonableness, the reliability of pro-
cesses, understanding, problem-solving capacity, and epistemic responsibility 
– that can be considered an indication of epistemic quality. As I have already 
noted, I use the concept of truth as a generic marker of epistemic quality, be-
cause I want to stress that, although we are talking about a plurality of epistem-
ic values, I nonetheless assume the existence of objective epistemic value. In 
doing this, I distance my approach from post-modern and other theories that 
negate the objective, trans-historical, and universal value of truth, and which I 
consider a certain kind of epistemic revisionism or nihilism (Rorty 1979, Hol-
lis and Lukes 1982). In other words, although social epistemology and virtue 
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epistemology, and my rejection of truth monism, allow us to evaluate differ-
ent epistemic accomplishments (Kvanvig 2005), I still distance myself from all 
kinds of relativism concerning objective epistemic quality, or the stance we 
can have various equally valuable truths, or that opposing stances can have 
equal epistemic value. Although virtue epistemology focuses on the epistemic 
virtues of the epistemic agent, and only derivatively concerns the concept of 
truth, it is certainly not an approach that endorses relativism, revisionism, or 
nihilism regarding truth.
The reasonableness and validity of reasons, therefore, can only be epistem-
ically justified if it refers to an objectively valuable epistemic property. Rea-
sonable pluralism is undoubtedly methodologically epistemologically helpful 
because it relates to epistemic diversity, inclusiveness, openness to opposing 
attitudes, perspectives, evidence and arguments, and mutual respect. These are 
procedures that can enhance the final epistemic quality. If, however, we set 
reasonable pluralism or reasonable disagreement as our final epistemic aim or 
the ultimate epistemic value, then this entails a relativization and rejection of 
the notion of objective epistemic value. Although states of disagreement are 
natural and even conducive to the better quality of final decisions, beliefs, or 
solutions to problems - they cannot be deemed an epistemic accomplishment, 
because this would mean that conflicting attitudes can be of equal objective 
epistemic value. In that vein, I hold that reasonable disagreement and reason-
able pluralism, as I note in my book, are certainly a political value since they 
establish respectful stability between disagreeing parties. However, political 
value does not automatically generate epistemic value, and endorsing this at-
titude is a political instrumentalization of epistemic virtues. 
The epistemic value of reasonable disagreement is, as I have noted, proce-
dural or methodological, and includes the notion of truth as a regulative epis-
temic aim. In that sense, Rawls’ proposal, even in the manner Baccarini en-
hances it, is still primarily in the realm of political justification, or at least still 
prioritizes the political to the epistemic. The epistemic virtue of reasonable-
ness is in the function of valuable and long-lasting political stability, which is 
undoubtedly very important. From the perspective of political radicalization 
and the deteriorating quality of civic agency, which is how Baccarini opens his 
article, the value of reasonable persons, valid public reasons, reasonable plu-
rality, and the state of reasonable disagreement, cannot be disputed. However, 
from my perspective, it is not sufficient for an appropriate balance between 
political and epistemic virtues. Epistemic quality requires beliefs/decisions/
solutions that do not only tame present tensions and prevent political disasters, 
but that also solve problems, and are correct, truth-sensitive, and truth-con-
ductive. Finally, I ought to stress that, in the goal of harmonizing the highest 
political with the highest epistemic quality, it is possible to “negotiate” or to 
sacrifice “truth” to urgent political values. It is possible, in critical situations, 
to achieve to mere political functionality of democracy, to endorse reasonable 
disagreement as a satisfactory epistemic value, but it cannot be the ultimate 
epistemic virtue of democracy.
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4. The Division of Epistemic Labor, or how to Overcome 
the Limitations of Individual and Collective Intelligence
Once we inquire about the epistemic quality of democracy, or, precisely, about 
the epistemic quality of democratic outcomes, solutions to problems, beliefs, 
and decisions, it is natural to wonder about the best way of achieving them. 
In introducing the division of epistemic labor, which assigns a unique role to 
experts, there is the question of privileging a minority elite, which Mladenović 
had implied from the position of epistemic proceduralism (Peter 2016). How-
ever, on the other hand, there is the question of whether experts genuinely 
possess the necessary expertise to solve the citizens’ problems, and whether 
there is a better way to resolve issues. Here, I defend the stance that a division 
of epistemic labor between citizens and experts best balances the preservation 
of democratic and epistemic values, by neutralizing the limitations of individ-
ual and collective intelligence. Kristina Lekić Barunčić (2020), Ivana Janković 
(2020), and Marko-Luka Zubčić (2020), each in their unique way question the 
efficiency of the proposed division of epistemic labor.
Janković and Zubčić, upheld by careful arguments, emphasize the epistemic 
potential of collective deliberation in resolving complex problems. Both hold 
that, under specific conditions, groups will provide better answers to problems 
than individual – or even conjoined – experts. Although they both respect the 
importance of expertise and factual knowledge in resolving issues, they simply 
ask whether the proposed division of labor and the inclusion of experts is in-
deed the best avenue towards attaining knowledge and solving problems. Ac-
cording to them, citizens can resolve complex problem, rather than only partic-
ipate in defining the problems, choosing the experts whom they will trust, and 
overseeing whether the issues have been solved but in resolving the problems.
Janković quotes empirical findings that show the individual expertise of 
professionals is inferior to collective intelligence. Namely, the citizens’ random 
diversity, due to a real and spontaneous combination of perspectives, interpre-
tations, evidence, experiences, and like, guarantees more valuable decisions 
than those made by isolated experts constrained by their specific professional 
field. Even if they formed their own decision-making groups, experts cannot 
attain the level of diversity exhibited by random groups of citizens, because the 
very fact of their education, similar material status, and belonging to a group of 
peers, constrains their perspective. Janković does not dispute the fact experts 
exist, or that they possess superior factual knowledge, but still claims that – 
with the appropriate institutional framework of forming groups and inform-
ing citizens, while acknowledging their cognitive ablities and the capacity of 
diversity – a deliberative democratic process of collective decision-making 
would yield better results. Zubčić provides further evidence for the potential 
of collective intelligence and situational circumstances, and speaks of the in-
stitutional arrangements that can improve the reliability of citizens’ decisions. 
He highlights the epistemic potential of social epistemic inequalities, and of 
free and redundant disagreement during decision-making. If our goal is the 
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highest possible epistemic quality, according to Zubčić, we need to empower 
our problem-solving expertise, which has thus far wrongly focues on experts, 
rather than on the collective epistemic virtues of the people. Zubčić analyses the 
epistemic features of collectives or groups that insure civic expertise – epistem-
ic inequality, diversity, inclusiveness, pluralism, and the freedom to form and 
remain in redundant disagreement. It seems that Janković and Zubčić’s stance 
rests on Mill’s idea of the free market of ideas, epistemic potential of laisezz 
faire, or the free flow of ideas that trumps the epistemic strenght of experts 
(Mill 1859, Goldman and Cox 1996). Both augment Mill’s view by stressing the 
desirability and necessity of institutional regulation, acknowledging that the 
mere invisible hand of free public deliberation will not automatically derive 
quality from the pluralism and diversity of epistemically sub-optimal agents.
I almost completely agree with assumption that at the foot of their argu-
ments: the key to epistemic quality is not in experts, but in finding a system 
of procedures that most reliably solve the citizens’ problems. That is the very 
essence of reliability democracy. However, while I hold that experts are a nec-
essary part of the procedures that satisfy the condition of reliably solving prob-
lems, Janković and Zubčić range from the strong stance that it citizens rather 
than experts, to the milder attitude that experts do not always deserve their 
role in the division of labor.
The division of epistemic labor that I endorse is not rooted in the stance 
that groups of citizens have no cognitive potential, or that they are incapable – 
even with the right education or information, the appropriate affective stance 
towards opposing opinions, and with a proper institutional arrangement – of 
making decisions as good as those of experts. I have tried to underline the 
circumstances where the potential of diversity, pluralism, and inclusiveness 
will generate the highest benefits for resolving problems, and concluded that 
these circumstances are the moment of detecting the urgency of the issues, of 
choosing the relevant experts, and of overseeing whether the proposed solu-
tion genuinely resolves their problems (Goodin 2006, Zollman 2010). These 
tasks are part of the epistemic labor of citizens. The inclusion of experts in 
the division of labor is based on empirical findings concerning the limitations 
of collective intelligence – not just during majority voting, but during delib-
eration (Ahlstrom-Vij 2012; 2013).  These constraints include the hegemony of 
common knowledge (Prelec, Seung, McCoy, 2017), the common knowledge effect 
(Gigone and Hastie 1993, Sunstein 2006), the Dunning-Kruger effects (Dunning 
and Kruger, 1999) as well as the social conditions of the distribution of infor-
mation, such as informational filters, echo chambers, informational bubbles, 
and like. Non-experts, who are not involved in a specific field, usually lack the 
time, maturity, and factual knowledge needed to absorb expert information, 
and there are no institutional capacities to neutralize these social and cogni-
tive barriers to resolving problems. The wisdom of crowds, that Janković and 
Zubčić appeal for, rests on the idea that plurality and diversity can make up 
for the individual limitations of experts, but it does not acknowledge the fact 
experts can neutralize our collective weaknesses. My proposal of the division 
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of epistemic labor should – in the context of our search for epistemic quality 
– offset the limitation of both collective and individual decision-making. This 
reason is why I don’t think that experts should assume the entirety of epistemic 
labor, but, instead, just those aspects that will generate the highest epistemic 
quality. Part of the work belongs to citizens because they can neutralize the 
individual limitations of experts, and even of groups of experts.
Janković and Zubčić argue we should neutralize these collective limitations 
through institutional interventions and regulations, but they also believe citi-
zens can resolve complex problems without resorting to expert assistance. The 
role of experts, in this argument, needs to be as small as possible to ensure the 
most valuable result, and political justification. The form of reliability democ-
racy I propose is neither expertism nor epistocracy, but a position that favors 
those decision-making procedures that most reliably lead to epistemic quality. 
Reliability democracy rests on five veritistic criteria that guarantee the epis-
temic quality of a procedure: (i) reliability, or the ratio of true and false deci-
sions generated by this procedure; (ii) power, or the strength of the procedure 
that produces these decisions; (iii) fecundity, or the strength of the procedure 
to solve the problems of interest citizens; (iv) efficacy, or the cost-benefit ra-
tio of the procedure; (v) speed or the duration/time required for the procedure 
to solve the problem (Goldman 1999, Prijic Samarzija 2000). In other words, 
according to reliability democracy, if a different division of epistemic labor, 
including the one that assigns everything to citizens, is a better fit for these 
criteria, then it should be implemented. My opinion is that in our sub-ideal 
epistemic circumstances, which do not meet the minimum epistemic and af-
fective standards that would guarantee the quality of citizens’ beliefs (Kitcher 
2011), we need to entrust part of the labors to experts (Prijić Samaržija 2017). 
This proposal of the division of epistemic labor best combines the individual 
and collective epistemic virtues that guarantee the best solutions. 
Finally, Kristina Lekić Barunčić raises the interesting question of wheth-
er the division of epistemic labor between citizens and experts can be imple-
mented in real-world circumstances. The question is whether the model of 
reliability democracy, where citizens identify and define their problems, and 
oversee whether they are resolved efficiently, while experts address the issues, 
can function in real life. In her example, autism treatment policies showed that 
proponents of the neurodiversity movement did not trust the delegated ex-
perts, and concluded they could form better strategies by themselves. One of 
the reasons for this mistrust, and this refusal to accept the division of epistemic 
labor with experts, were their bad experiences derived from unsuccessful and 
discriminatory expert attempts to treat their illnesses. I hold that this discus-
sion points to two essential challenges concerning the division of epistemic 
labor. The first is the question when citizens are justified in granting experts 
their trust. The second is the inquiry about whether citizens can assess when 
they should split their labor with experts.
In my book, I endorse the idea of a derived authority of experts, rather 
than a fundamental authority, which would require the citizens’ blind trust 
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or deference to experts. The experts’ authority should be derived from their 
status of objective experts, rather than from their reputation. In other words, 
the experts’ trustworthiness should be grounded in the fact the citizens have 
witnessed their authority, i.e., their ability to solve complex problems through 
truth-revealing situations efficiently. The stance the experts’ authority is not 
fundamental and does not stem from their mere status rests on the demand 
for the citizens’ political and epistemic autonomy, and on the conditions for 
justifying trust. If citizens lack the evidential basis that would support an ex-
pert’s epistemic competence, their credulity would be neither justified nor epis-
temically responsible. Whether the citizens do possess sufficient evidence to 
recognize objective expertise in an epistemically responsible way is a separate 
problem that I talk about at length in my book. Still, my final stance is there are 
social mechanisms that do allow non-experts to recognize expertise (Goldman 
2001). The division of epistemic labor between citizens and experts under the 
condition of rationality can function even in sub-ideal epistemic circumstances.
However, there are real social situations that do not satisfy the minimum 
epistemic and affective conditions of epistemic agents, nor the preconditions 
of the public use of reason. On the contrary, they exhibit a dominance of will 
over reason, and intellectual and moral egoism. It is possible that the citizens 
will decide there is no better expert on specific questions than themselves 
alone, that their truths – given they are theirs and based on their right to be 
treated as free and equal – are as epistemically valuable as those of experts, and 
that no expertise is neutral and objective, but, instead, is always tied to some 
non-epistemic goals, or is contaminated by their personal values and epis-
temic background. It is this resistance to expertise and experts, and to science 
and rational debate, sometimes referred to as the culture of ignorance or the 
cult of amateurism, that marks our time more than any time past (DeNicola 
2017, Nichols 2017). Movements such as the anti-vaxxers are the most radical 
example. Should we, then, allow citizens and civic campaigns to make deci-
sions about topics where there are people whose expertise surpasses theirs? 
Kristina Lekić Barunčić endorses the stance about improving communication 
to ascertain whether there are the conditions for establishing evidence-based 
trust. This approach is undoubtedly one of the ways to create the epistemic and 
affective preconditions for the public use of reason. However, what should we 
do when there is no such will, when extremist attitudes are born and developed 
within echo chambers that stifle all communication with their resistance to 
opposing beliefs, which they consider dangerous and harmful? It is a consid-
erable challenge for the question of the feasibility of any division of epistemic 
labor. However, it must be said that the subject of the citizens’ political and 
epistemic autonomy must not be confused with their political and epistemic 
egoism. While the first is desirable, the second is undoubtedly blameworthy, 
and is not a manifestation of democracy, in particular when it assumes the 
form of radicalism or extremism.
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Epistemologija demokratije: epistemičke vrline demokratije
Apstrakt
Novo i vibrantno područje epistemologije demokratije ili istraživanje epistemičkog opravda-
nja demokratije kao društvenog sistema procedura, institucija i praksi nužno, kao interdisci-
plinarni poduhvat, povezuje epistemologe i filozofe politike. Uprkos mogućim prigovorima 
da ovakva vrsta diskusije ili nije dovoljno epistemološka ili da nije dovoljno filozofsko-poli-
tička, ovaj pristup upravo obeležava nakana usklađivanja političkog i epistemičkog opravda-
nja demokratije. U ovom se članku bavim nekim temeljnim izazovima vezanim uz prirodu 
epistemičkog opravdanja demokratije kao i pitanjem koji je najbolji teorijski okvir za uskla-
đivanje političkih i epistemičkih vrednosti. Takođe, posebno važnim smatram pitanje može li 
predložena podela epistemičkog posla i uključivanje stručnjaka doista poboljšati epistemički 
kvalitet odlučivanja bez pretnje za političko opravdanje. U članku argumentujem u prilog tri 
teze; (i) ne samo procedura, već i ishodi demokratije, kao društvenog sistema, treba da budu 
epistemički vredni, (ii) epistemička vrlina demokratije više je od prikladnog sredstva za poli-
tičke ciljeve, (iii) podela epistemičkog posla u demokratiji treba da nadiđe kako ograničenja 
individualne i kolektivne inteligencije.
Ključne reči: epistemologija demokratije, epistemičko opravdanje demokratije, socijalna epi-
stemologija, epistemologija vrline, pluralizam epistemičkih vrednosti, podela epistemičkog 
posla 
